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Why do we accept a narrative discourse 
ascribed to a “third-person narrator” as 
true? The classical, and a cognitive approach
Abstract: The aim of the present paper is to discuss the question of why readers 
accept a literary narrative discourse attributed traditionally to an “omniscient 
third-person narrator” unconditionally as true. I will advocate two theses. First, 
that this characteristic of narrative comprehension is a consequence of a grammat-
ical feature of the narrative discourse, namely, the absence of the “narrating-I.” 
This format mimics what Cosmides and Tooby label as scope-free representa-
tion, i.e., a representation that is not bound by scope-operators and thus treated 
by a cognitive architecture as architecturally true. Second, narrative discourse 
ascribed traditionally to a third person narrator should be understood as the lin-
guistic representation of the true states of affairs of a narrative world.
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1  Background and introduction: The traditional 
understanding of the third-person narrator and 
its psychological criticism
The majority of the traditional narratological explanations, implicitly or explic-
itly, take a binary pragmatic model, derived from the idea of a fictive communica-
tion situation, as the basic model of the narrative texts.1 According to this model, 
Erzsébet Szabó: University of Szeged. E-mail: saboe@lit.u-szeged.hu
1 The above model tries to offer a standard view on different traditional (communicational) 
 concepts of narratives. In this aim it corresponds to the accounts provided by Bernáth 2006, 
 Patron 2006, 2012, and Margolin 2009, 2011. Bernáth distinguishes between communicational 
and constructional or poetic accounts, Patron differentiates between communicational and non- 
communicational or poetic theories of narrative fiction, Margolin proposes a three-component 
model to describe the diverse concepts in a systematic way.
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narrative texts consist – within the frames of fiction, and only there – on the 
whole of two discourses; on the one hand, of a discourse ascribed to an anony-
mous anthropomorphic originator called third-person narrator, while on the other 
hand of discourses attributed to the characters of the story. It is generally as-
sumed that the two discourses differ with respect to their truth-value. While 
the utterances of the fictional characters can be either true or false with respect 
to  their own fictive world, the fictional third-person narrator’s utterances are 
 unqualifiedly true and accurate. No one doubts that the family of Dashwood 
had long been settled in Sussex, as no one questions that their estate was large, 
and their residence was at Norland Park, in the center of their property, where, 
for  many generations, they had lived in so respectable a manner as to engage 
the  general good opinion of their surrounding acquaintance (cf. Austen 1992 
[1811]: 3).2
The reasons behind the above difference in the semantic status of the utter-
ances are seen as relatively identical by the advocates of the traditional model. 
Theoreticians follow the strategy of analogical reasoning and explain the fictive 
discourse generally by linguistic or philosophical theories that have been evolved 
for describing real-world speech and real-world communication. Thus, they claim 
that the truth conditions of the characters’ utterances are analogous to the truth 
conditions of everyday utterances and can be defined according to the correspon-
dence theories, pragmatist theories or coherence theories of truth. The unques-
tionable truth of the third-person narrators’ discourse, however, relies primarily 
on poetic conventions. The readers accept the narrator’s utterances as true and 
the narrator as authentic and “omniscient” (at least in relation to the fictive 
world) because of typological and generic norms.3
It is clear even from this short overview that the central element of the tradi-
tional model is the anonymous third-person narrator. The reason for this lies not 
only in his distinct role in truth-claiming. Since he, by definition, cannot do any-
thing else but tell the truth, it is his speech that also serves as the basis for the 
evaluation of the characters’ utterances. It defines the fictional facts of the fictive 
world in relation to which the content of the agents’ utterances are true or false. 
Or, to put it another way, it provides the set of propositions with which true prop-
ositions cohere and false propositions do not. Consequently, according to this 
model, the readers’ most important interpretative operation is the identification 
2 “The family of Dashwood had long been settled in Sussex. Their estate was large, and their 
residence was at Norland Park, in the center of their property, where, for many generations, they 
had lived in so respectable a manner as to engage the general good opinion of their surrounding 
acquaintance” (Austen 1992 [1811]: 3).
3 Cf. Doležel 1998: 149–152.
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of the third-person narrator as well as the construction of the communication 
situation in which he utters.
The practice of comprehension, however, is quite different. Already several 
decades ago, some theoreticians like Banfield (1982), Martínez-Bonati (1991), 
and Garrig (1993) assumed that readers of narratives are “normally paying atten-
tion to the characters and events and not minding the transparent medium of the 
narrative itself” (Martínez-Bonati 1991: 66). Contemporary discourse psychology 
confirms this assumption. Using a source-memory test to assess the salience of 
agents in memory (i.e., examining whether readers re membered who expressed a 
particular speech act in literary short stories),  Graesser et al. carried out a number 
of tests (1999, 2001; Graesser and Wiemer- Hastings 1999; Graesser & Klettke 2001) 
that showed that, under normal reading conditions, the anonymous, omniscient, 
third-person narrator is an entirely invisible agent to the readers.4 “The reader is 
entirely unable to discriminate exactly what was said by the third-person narrator” 
(Graesser et al. 2001: 226, emphasis mine). In contrast, the first-person narrator is 
very salient and the characters are moderately visible.5 The tests have also veri-
fied that, despite natural differences among comprehenders in cognitive abilities, 
social backgrounds, gender, verbal ability or literary expertise, this mechanism is 
quite uniform.
However, if readers do not even realize the presence of a third-person narra-
tor, nor the communication situation in which he makes utterances, how could 
they take his discourse as true based on his person’s conventional authority? 
There must be another reason for this comprehension strategy. In this paper, I 
try to find a solution to this problem. I will start with the outline of the most com-
prehensive and systematic reformulation of the traditional model evolved by 
 Gérard Genette, which offers an adequate background for clarifying the tradition-
ally notion of the third-person narrator and for the description of his discourse. In 
a second step, I will contrast Genette’s insights with the theory of the evolution-
ary psychologists John Tooby and Leda Cosmides on the functioning of cognitive 
mechanisms evolved to store and exploit contingent information. Finally, I will 
draw some conclusions concerning the traditional communicational theories of 
narrative.
4 The researchers selected sentences that could have been spoken by the narrator and by sev-
eral of the characters.
5 “The mean source discrimination parameters were .00, .85, and .46 for the omniscient third- 
person narrator, the first-person narrator, and the nonnarrator characters, respectively” 
 (Graesser et al. 2001: 266). See also Duchan et al. (1995).
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2  Genette’s communicational model of narrative 
and his reformulation of the traditional concept 
of the third-person narrator
Undoubtedly, one of the most influential descriptive accounts in narratology over 
the last decades has been formulated by Gérard Genette (1980 [1972], [1988] 1983). 
Genette does not question the foundational theses of the traditional communica-
tional model of narrative fiction and bases his taxonomy upon four assumptions. 
(1) The first disconnects the narrative discourse (the text) from the real author and 
his speech act (pretended assertion) and says that discourse “is produced by the 
action of [ fictional narrating] in the same way that any statement is the product of 
an act of enunciating” (Genette 1980 [1972]: 26, emphasis mine).6 (2) The second 
repeats the classical narratological thesis according to which discourse contains 
a story. Thus, it can also be regarded as the rhetorical-grammatical extension 
of  one transformation verb or one statement such as Ulysses comes home to 
Ithaca or Marcel becomes a writer.7 (3) The third connects (1) and (2) and claims 
that story and narrating exist only by means of the intermediary of discourse. 
Our  knowledge of the two is indirect, “unavoidably mediated by the narrative 
discourse” (Genette 1980 [1972]: 28) that consequently should be understood 
as the textual manifestation of the generation of a story by means of language. 
(4) Finally, he concludes that narrative analyses should capture the presence of 
the narrating and the recounted story in the text – a claim that gave narratology a 
new direction.
In order to examine the presence of the narrating and the story in the dis-
course, Genette introduces three autonomous categories, borrowed from the 
grammar of verbs: voice, mood, and tense. Voice follows the traces and marks left 
behind by the process of narrating in the text. It conveys terms for describing the 
way how narrating is anchored to deictic centers, consisting of a “narrating-I” the 
“here” and “now” of the narrating, and a receiver called “narratee.”8 Tense and 
mood in contrast account for the temporal and modal presence of the story in the 
discourse. The sub-terms of tense designate the way that discourse represents – 
6 Genette took over the term “enunciating” from the French linguist Émil Benveniste.
7 “I walk, Pierre has come are for me minimal forms of narrative, and inversely the Odyssey or the 
Recherche is only, in a certain way, an amplification (in the rhetorical sense) of statements such 
as Ulysses comes home to Ithaca or Marcel becomes a writer” (Genette 1980 [1972]: 30).
8 Genette emphasizes that “ ‘I’, ‘here,’ and ‘now’ refer to the spatiotemporal circumstances of 
that narrating and in no way to the circumstances of the writing” of a narrative work by its real 
author (Genette 1980 [1972]: 214).
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syntagmatically arranges, repeats or spatially depicts – the order, the duration, 
and the recurrence of the events of the story. Mood refers to the modalities of 
signifying. On the one hand, it provides terms for describing the degree of “mime-
sis” by producing of speech, thoughts, and events (distance). On the other hand, 
it specifies a kind of information channel for the narrating instance, a situated 
focus (for example a character) within the here and now of the narrated world (or 
as Genette labels the “diegese,” 1988 [1983]: 84) and restricts the narrating to the 
sort of information that the logic of this situation allows ( focalization).9 Thus, 
both “distance” and “focalization” are determinants designating the selection of 
the narrative information with respect to a hypothetical completeness due to spe-
cific (e.g., situational) conditions.10
It is important to emphasize that “each and every narrative is inflected by 
voice, mood, and tense just as each verb can be categorized in relation to this 
triad. She would not have been killed, for instance, is a passive voice, indicative 
mood and past conditional tense” (Fludernik 2009: 89). Analogously, there is 
no connection between a narrative’s tense, mood or voice. These parameters are 
regulated independently from each other and can be freely combined. The voice 
narrating “The family of Dashwood had long been settled in Sussex” is anchored 
to an instance that is external to the spatio-temporal universe of the primary story 
(it is situated on an extradiegetic level), but theoretically it could be tied, for ex-
ample, to a story-intern instance, as well and appear as a character (as a homo-
diegetic narrator) in the story. And similarly, the utterance is unfocalized, which 
means that there is no restriction of narrative information and the narrating in-
stance has theoretically access to all details concerning the story by generating 
the discourse. However, his access could be also restricted to the particular per-
spective of a character situated within the fictive world (internal focalization). In 
this case, the narrator could share only information that this character perceives, 
thinks or speaks. What’s more, he could even then tell more (paralipsis) or less 
(paralepsis) that would be logically produced under the type of focalization se-
lected. “Combinability is at its maximum,” as Fludernik notes (Fludernik 2009: 
89), and the author is in his invention in no way constrained by the natural limits 
of human enunciation.
This combinatorial concept of the narratology, as Genette asserts, can 
point out the failures of some traditional terms like “perspective,” “omniscience,” 
9 “The instrument of this possible selection is a situated focus, a sort of information-conveying 
pipe that allows passage only of information that is authorized by the situation” (Genette 1988 
[1983]: 74).
10 For a brief historical survey of narratological approaches and the contextualization of 
 Genette’s concept, see Scheffel 2009.
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“narrative situation,” “narrator” or “third-person narrator.” The model shows 
that the narrator is nothing else, but a purely enunciating instance (the subject 
of voice). Genette claims repeatedly that he is always present11 and he is always in 
a first person12, quasi a fictional narrating-I. He characterizes him (1) by his pres-
ence or absence as a character in the story he tells; (2) by the spatio-temporal 
coordinates (levels) of his telling; and (3) by his temporal position relative to the 
narrated story. The model also highlights that questions traditionally concerning 
the “knowledge” or the “perspective” of the narrator belong under the category 
of “focalization.” The narrator knows nothing and perceives nothing, since he is 
“just” a narrating voice and not automatically also the source of point of view. It 
is the particular type of focalization – ultimately “the author himself” (Genette 
1988 [1983]: 73) – that (who) regulates what information he is and what he is not 
allowed to know, perceive, and narrate.
Thus, concerning the traditional term “third-person narrator,” Genette em-
phasizes that it can be properly defined by the distinction (1). The “third-person 
narrator,” he claims, is simply a fictional narrating-I who has never the status of a 
character in the story told. Unlike the “first-person narrator” who does appear in 
the diegetic universe of the narrative as one of the characters, he remains “absent 
from the story he tells” (Genette 1980 [1972]: 244, emphasis mine). Nothing proves 
this more than the fact that he can, in principle, at any moment make himself 
visible as a character by using one of the first person pronouns “I” or “We” to des-
ignate himself like in “The family of Dashwood – this is how we will name a rich 
family – had long been settled in Sussex.” Or, to give another example, “Their 
estate was large, and their residence was at Norland Park … This, however, is 
of but little importance to my tale.” In connection with this, Genette also men-
tions that every sentence and every text can be transformed in this way from 
“third-person narrative” to “first-person narrative” – and conversely, from “first- 
person narrative” to “third-person narrative.”13 This transition does not change 
the truth-value of the utterances since both narrators may be combined with zero 
focalization that grants them unrestricted “access to every conceivable region of 
the storyworld” (Niederhoff 2009: 390).
11 “Narrative without a narrator, the utterance without an uttering, seems to me pure illusion 
and, as such, ‘unfalsifiable’ ” (Genette 1988 [1983]: 101).
12 “The narrator can be in his narrative (like every subject of an enunciating in his enunciated 
statement) only in the ‘first person’ ” (Genette 1980 [1972]: 244).
13 The history of literature is rich also in real transitions: Kafka’s The Castle, Jame’s The Ambas-
sadors, Dostoevski’s Crime and Punishment are examples for crossing from first-person to third, 
Keller’s Green Henry exemplifies a transfer in the other direction. Genette analyses such cases of 
“transvocalization” in Palimpsests 1997 [1982].
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Coming back now to the initial question of this paper – why do readers accept 
a narrative discourse attributed to a “third-person narrator” as true? – Genette’s 
clarifying of the traditional concept “third-person narrator” shows that the 
 answer is not connected to either the “person” of a fictive narrator, or to his 
 unrestricted perspective (“omniscience”). The former is not relevant for the 
 narratology, while the latter may be combined also with the character-narrator. 
Genette shows no interest for this question, however, his analysis implicates 
that  the answer of the communicational theories of narrative fiction may be 
linked to the difference between the visibility and the non-visibility (hiddenness) 
of the narrating I as a character. This assumption seems to explain why “the only 
agent who [is] invisible to reader(s) [is] the omniscient, third-person narrator” 
(Graesser 2001: 271). But, it is also clear, that it offers no explanation for why 
 readers accept a discourse ascribed to a hidden narrating instance (of which they 
are not even aware) as unqualifiedly true, a discourse ascribed to the same (but 
visible) narrator, however, as not true. The assumption of an identical (though not 
always visible) structure of fictive communication behind the two forms of narrating 
deprives their distinction from any explanatory force. If, in essence, the two forms 
don’t differ, there is nothing (except maybe the poetic tradition) that could give 
rise to the difference in the evaluation of the truth value they are assigned during 
the course of comprehension.
However, what may cause the above difference in the comprehension strate-
gy of readers? Is there really an invisible narrating-I? Does the text really have 
the status of a discourse? In what follows I will suggest an argument for the no- 
narrator position based on the theory of the evolutionary psychologists Tooby 
and Cosmides on cognitive processing of contingently true information. Only the 
“non-evolutionary” part of their reasoning is relevant for this paper, that is, the 
description of the cognitive machinery evolved for regulating the scope of appli-
cability of representations of contingent information. I will argue that behind the 
“third-person discourse” there is no hidden fictive narrating-I. Only this assump-
tion may explain the connections of this kind of text with the notion of truth.
3  Cosmides and Tooby on scope-representation 
systems and the consequences of the theory 
on understanding narratives
In their seminal paper “Consider the source: The evaluation of adaptations for 
decoupling and metarepresentation” (2000) Leda Cosmides and John Tooby as-
sert that one of the distinctive features of the human mind is that it can treat 
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 information that is not held widely in space and time. The mind is rather a hetero-
geneous collection of a great number of highly specialized computational devices 
or programs, some of which are evolved to extract and exploit information based 
on relationships that are only true temporarily, locally or contingently.14
Essential for a computational system that also works with local, transient or 
contingent facts is to “detect and keep track of which information is applicable 
where, and how the boundaries of applicability shift” (Cosmides and Tooby 2000: 
58). This is important not only because contingent information could be false, 
misleading or harmful outside the boundaries where it is applicable, but also be-
cause it could corrupt valid existing data-sets that it enters into inferences with. 
Thus, Cosmides and Tooby suppose that there is a large number of adaptations 
that have evolved to locate, monitor, update, and represent the boundaries within 
which each set of representations remains useful, including a new information for-
mat (scope-representation) and a syntax for regulating the scope of applicability 
of representations about contingent information.
Cosmides and Tooby hypothesize that the human cognitive system stores 
 locally, transiently, and contingently true information like “In the Middle Ages 
people used to think that the Earth was the center of the universe,”15 “In Paris it 
is raining,”16 “Anne believes that John is honest” in a suppositional format they 
call scope-representation. A scope-representation is a representation that is cogni-
tively quarantined (decoupled) by a scope-operator “which describe[s] the bound-
ary conditions under which the information is known to be accurate” (Cosmides 
and Tooby 2000: 63). It involves a minimum of two levels, a subordinate level for 
the decoupled proposition (“the Earth is the center of the universe,” “It is rain-
ing,” “John is honest”), and a superordinate (or ground state) level for the scope 
information (“in the Middle Ages people used to think that,” “In Paris,” “Anne 
believes that”) that indicates the boundaries (i.e., the evaluation context) within 
which they are true.
Cosmides and Tooby stress that this kind of cognitive architecture operates in 
a way that is similar, in some respect, to natural deduction systems. Operators keep 
propositions of unevaluated or suspended truth value as scope-bound (that is, as 
true within the scope). They allow drawing inferences only on the level that they 
regulate while keeping the computational products isolated from each other “until 
the truth or utility of the suppositions is decided, and the outputs are either inte-
grated [in other knowledge stores] or discarded” (Cosmides and Tooby 2000: 59).
14 For example “Snakes are poisonous” versus “Brown water snakes are not poisonous and bite 
only when molested.”
15 Example of Zunshine in 2006: 51.
16 Example of Recanati in 2000: 59.
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Based on this, and this is where, as I see, the model holds relevant insights 
for the problem of this paper, Cosmides and Tooby suggest distinguishing two 
fundamentally different types of information inside the architecture of a scope- 
system. One type consists of information that the system treats as architecturally 
true. Architecturally true information is scope-free or unmarked information. As 
such it is “allowed to migrate (or be reproduced) in an unrestricted scope-free 
fashion throughout [the] architecture, interacting with any other data in the sys-
tem with which it is capable of interacting” (Cosmides and Tooby 2000: 60–61, 
emphasis mine). Another type of information is scope-bound and tagged as 
“false” or more precisely as “true from a certain perspective,” “might-be-true,” 
“true-only-here,” “once-was-true” and so on. It is allowed to enter into inferences 
only within the boundaries of its operator. It should be emphasized that every 
architecturally true statement (“it is p”) “can be transformed by a scope opera-
tion into something scope-limited, as new information about its boundary condi-
tions is learned” (e.g., “it appears that p”; “she believes that p”; “it is no more p”; 
Cosmides and Tooby 2000: 63). And conversely, scope-limitations can be dis-
charged. Once a fact is established to a sufficient degree of certainty, scope-tags 
are lost. “For example, most people cannot remember who told them that apples 
are edible or that plants photosynthesize” (Cosmides and Tooby 2000: 70).17 Cos-
mides and Tooby call the mechanism that underlies this transformation the 
 coupling-decoupling system and claim that this highly dynamic mechanism of cou-
pling, decoupling, and recoupling of information is responsible for information 
processing and error correction.
The connections of this mechanism to one special kind of “false” information 
labelled as fictional narrative are even intuitively recognizable. Cosmides and 
Tooby assume that readers decouple information conveyed in form of fictional 
narratives18 from other data structures and evaluate it in a scope-representational 
system in a highly dynamic process of couplings, decouplings, and recouplings of 
propositions. Based on research, on the one hand, on neuropsychological defi-
cits related to understanding of fiction and on memory-retrieval experiments on 
the other, they suppose that the scope-representations that are involved in this 
process are metarepresentations. Cosmides and Tooby hold the view that me-
tarepresentations are used to represent source-based representations of possible 
states of the actual world (somebody’s goals and plans, personal past, beliefs, 
thought experiments) and parallel actual words or fictions (word-creations or sim-
ulations). They have two distinctive features. First, their operators require as 
17 Cosmides and Tooby refer here also to the research of Sperber, Tulving, and Shimamura.
18 More precisely: stories they believe to be fictional.
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 argument a source-tag that represents who it is that believes (plans, remembers, 
intends, claims, etc.) something concerning the actual world, or creates a fic-
tional. Second, they suspend semantic relations such as truth, reference, and 
 existence for the embedded propositions: what is believed, claimed, planned, 
imagined, created must not be true or exist in the actual world (only in the 
source’s belief world, in the world of fiction, etc.).19 “Jane Austen created Sense 
and Sensibility” is a metarepresentation because it represents Sense and Sensi-
bility as Austen’s representation of a fictional world. Similarly, “[Austen created 
that] / [In the novel Sense and Sensibility] Elinor believes that Edward Ferrars has 
married Miss Lucy Steel” represents a state of affairs that involves Edward Ferrars 
and Miss Lucy Steel standing in a certain relation as Elinor’s belief. “Elinor be-
lieves” takes scope over the representation. It tells something about the fictional 
world created by Austen (cf. also Zunshine 2006).
Thus, Cosmides and Tooby propose that in the interaction with fictional 
 stories readers may behave essentially the same way as in cases where they 
find themselves confronted with source-dependent contingent information: they 
consider the source and weight truth-values of the decoupled representations 
originating from different sources (author, characters). Cosmides and Tooby don’t 
examine the evaluation process itself, however. They do not even raise the ques-
tion concerning the basis on which readers regard scope-bound representations 
as true, or how they (re)construct the coherent whole of information that de-
scribes the state of affairs obtain in a fictional world. They are primarily con-
cerned with the consequences of this computational structure for the adaptive 
function of (narrative) fiction and its relationships to human improvisational in-
telligence. Literary theoreticians who base their narrative theoretic approach on 
the model of Tooby and Cosmides (Iversen 2011) also fail to address this  issue. It 
is clear, however, that the model can offer an adequate frame for answering these 
questions.
With regard to the problem of this paper – why do readers accept a narrative 
discourse ascribed to a “third-person narrator” as true? – the model holds four 
relevant insights. (1) First, it points out that readers may represent sentences like 
“The family of Dashwood had long been settled in Sussex,” or “Their estate was 
large, and their residence was at Norland Park” as source-free or unmarked repre-
sentations at the ground state of the representational system in which they process 
19 Cosmides and Tooby give the following example: “Shirley MacLaine believes that she is the 
reincarnation of an Egyptian princess named Nefru. This can be true without Nefru ever having 
existed and without it being true that Sherley is her reincarnation” (Cosmides and Tooby 2000: 
72). By evolving this statement, Cosmides and Tooby refer to Frege’s and Kripke’s studies on 
propositional attitudes.
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information of the text. As source-free representations they are treated as archi-
tecturally true, so they are licensed to migrate anywhere in the architecture, that 
is, they may enter into inferences in combination with any other ground state 
data-structure, and may be allowed to interact with sub ordinated levels, as well. 
This assumption can properly explain why readers are not able to discriminate 
exactly what was “said” by the “third-person narrator” in the stories and why 
they regard these sentences as unqualifiedly true. Presumably, the most crucial 
element of these kinds of sentences is the lack of a source. This unmarkedness 
determines that they are processed not as utterances but as representations spec-
ifying states of affairs that obtain at the fictional world. Ascribing a source-tag (for 
example a hidden narrating instance) to them – as the communicational theories 
of narrative do – fakes their status within the architecture.
(2) Second, the lack of a source-tag, however, doesn’t mean that these repre-
sentations are not scope-bound. They are architecturally true representations of 
a scope-system which is decoupled and subordinated by readers as a coherent 
whole under a scope operator. The decoupled propositions must be evaluated 
under the scope which the operator indicates. According to Cosmides and Tooby, 
in case of fiction the decoupled scope-representational system is subsumed under 
the operator “[X] creates that …” or “[X] creates the fictional world that …”. What 
follows – and this has crucial consequences for the understanding and interpre-
tation of narratives – is that truth conditions of the decoupled system are given 
with respect to the tag “creates a fictional word.” As I see it, the distinctive feature 
of this scope-predicate is that it also suspends the semantic relation perspective for 
the embedded propositions. Sentences like “The family of Dashwood had long 
been settled in Sussex” or “Their estate was large, and their residence was at 
Norland Park” are not bound to the subjective perspective of a real-world source, 
but to the “perspective” of the evaluation system given by the predicate “create.” 
In many respects they are like “ ‘Apples are edible,’ ‘Water boils at one-hundred 
degrees Celsius,’ or ‘The sum of the angles of a triangle is equal to two right 
 angles’.”20 These source-free sentences are true according to the actual world. 
Their unmarkedness is a sign that they are unrestrictedly true in the world.
(3) Third, the model may explain why readers comprehend literary narratives 
in such different ways. Cosmides and Tooby emphasize that readers use the same 
scope-syntax to represent scope-limitations of information by source. As shown 
20 These are examples in Genette 1980 [1972]: 212. He cites the sentences in the following con-
text: “ ‘For a long time I used to go to bed early’: obviously, such a statement – unlike, let us say, 
‘Water boils at one-hundred degrees Celsius’ or ‘The sum of the angles of a triangle is equal to 
two right angles’ – can be interpreted only with respect to the person who utters it and the situa-
tion in which he utters it.” Cf. also Genette 1988 [1983]: 101.
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above, metarepresentations underlie not only representations of fictional narra-
tives, but also representations of personal beliefs, intentions, desires, plans, 
goals, pretense, deception, personal past, thought experiments, simulations of 
the physical world or simulations of social interactions.21 Thus, readers may more 
easily subsume and evaluate narratives under different scope tags than “create” 
and represent them as the author’s personal past, belief, desire, etc. Expressions, 
such as “Austen thinks that …,” “The author claims that …,” and “She intends 
that …” are documents of this reading practice.22 Furthermore, due to the same 
processing structure of metarepresentations inferences may easily arise.
(4) Fourth, the model sheds light on the failures of the traditional taxonomies 
concerning the different grades of reliability (authenticity) or unreliability (inau-
thenticity) of the characters of the story. According to this approach, first-person 
narrators are less reliable than third-person and more trustworthy than char-
acters. It is easy to recognize that reliability and unreliability are not static fea-
tures of the characters. Information originating from different sources can  equally 
be true or false. It can change its status and source-free information can receive a 
source-tag. The true value of the representations of a literary text is defined pri-
mary in relation to the scope-boundaries that establish the fictional world.23
4 Concluding remarks
The aim of the present paper was to answer the question of why readers accept 
a  literary narrative discourse attributed traditionally to an “omniscient third- 
person narrator” unconditionally as true. This question is well-known in narra-
tive theory since Käte Hamburger published Die Logik der Dichtung (‘The Logic 
of  Literature’) in 1957. Hamburger (1993 [1957]), and a few decades later Anne 
 Banfield (1982), Sige-Yuki Kuroda (1973) and Árpád Bernáth (2006) argued on 
 different theoretical bases that there is no fictive narrator behind a third-person 
text. This paper has developed a cognitive argument for this position. According 
to this, the truth ascribed to the “third-person text” is a consequence of scope- 
representational processing and storage of the information conveyed in the form 
of a fictional narrative.
21 “Once a design that satisfies a particular set of computational requirements exists, natural 
selections can engineer solutions to new adaptive information-processing problems that pose 
similar requirements more quickly by modifying the existing design than by creating totally new 
designs from scratch” (Cosmides and Tooby 2000: 79).
22 Of course, there are some contexts where this approach is adequate (e.g., literary history).
23 For more on this concept, see Bernáth 1980.
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